diff --git a/backport-0001-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Lookup-key-for-merging-inserting-only-by-primary.patch b/backport-0001-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Lookup-key-for-merging-inserting-only-by-primary.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a612ec92bb8ff758773156bc8eea40bf90191dc --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0001-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Lookup-key-for-merging-inserting-only-by-primary.patch @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +From deeaac89f55ef6a4dc1e859b0fb0f4e4ed6e86cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Koch +Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 14:44:23 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] gpg: Lookup key for merging/inserting only by primary + key. + +* g10/getkey.c (get_keyblock_byfpr_fast): Add arg primary_only and +implement. +* g10/import.c (import_one_real): Simplify filling the fpr buffer with +zeroes. +(import_one_real): Find key only by primary fingerprint. +-- + +This should have been done early: When looking up the original +keyblock we want to update, we need to lookup it up only using the +primary key. This avoids to find a key which has the primary key also +has a subkey. + +GnuPG-bug-id: 7527 + +(ported by dkg from commit 25d748c3dfc0102f9e54afea59ff26b3969bd8c1 +from STABLE-BRANCH-2-4) + +Reference link: +https://salsa.debian.org/debian/gnupg2/-/blob/debian/2.2.46-6/debian/patches/from-2.4/gpg-Lookup-key-for-merging-inserting-only-by-primary-key.patch + +Signed-off-by: baogen shang +--- + g10/getkey.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- + g10/import.c | 6 +++--- + g10/keydb.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c +index 4642174..4747176 100644 +--- a/g10/getkey.c ++++ b/g10/getkey.c +@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key * pk, + gpg_error_t err; + KBNODE keyblock; + +- err = get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (&keyblock, NULL, fprint, fprint_len, 0); ++ err = get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (&keyblock, NULL, 0, fprint, fprint_len, 0); + if (!err) + { + if (pk) +@@ -1987,10 +1987,13 @@ get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key * pk, + * R_HD may be NULL. If LOCK is set the handle has been opend in + * locked mode and keydb_disable_caching () has been called. On error + * R_KEYBLOCK is set to NULL but R_HD must be released by the caller; +- * it may have a value of NULL, though. This allows to do an insert +- * operation on a locked keydb handle. */ ++ * it may have a value of NULL, though. This allows one to do an insert ++ * operation on a locked keydb handle. If PRIMARY_ONLY is set ++ * the function returns a keyblock which has the requested fingerprint ++ * has primary key.*/ + gpg_error_t + get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_hd, ++ int primary_only, + const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, int lock) + { + gpg_error_t err; +@@ -1998,6 +2001,8 @@ get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_hd, + kbnode_t keyblock; + byte fprbuf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; + int i; ++ byte tmpfpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; ++ size_t tmpfprlen; + + if (r_keyblock) + *r_keyblock = NULL; +@@ -2031,6 +2036,7 @@ get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_hd, + if (r_hd) + *r_hd = hd; + ++ again: + err = keydb_search_fpr (hd, fprbuf); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) + { +@@ -2050,6 +2056,17 @@ get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_hd, + log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY); + ++ if (primary_only) ++ { ++ fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, tmpfpr, &tmpfprlen); ++ if (fprint_len != tmpfprlen || memcmp (fprint, tmpfpr, fprint_len)) ++ { ++ release_kbnode (keyblock); ++ keyblock = NULL; ++ goto again; ++ } ++ } ++ + /* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields + properly set. */ + +diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c +index 0ce702e..b2a1462 100644 +--- a/g10/import.c ++++ b/g10/import.c +@@ -1859,7 +1859,6 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl, + int mod_key = 0; + int same_key = 0; + int non_self = 0; +- size_t an; + char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; + int merge_keys_done = 0; + KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL; +@@ -1879,8 +1878,8 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl, + pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; + + fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr2, &fpr2len); +- for (an = fpr2len; an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN; an++) +- fpr2[an] = 0; ++ if (MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN > fpr2len) ++ memset (fpr2+fpr2len, 0, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN - fpr2len); + keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid ); + uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID ); + +@@ -2028,6 +2027,7 @@ import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl, + + /* Do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */ + err = get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (&keyblock_orig, &hd, ++ 1 /*primary only */, + fpr2, fpr2len, 1/*locked*/); + if ((err + && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY +diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h +index 0f8d711..7457479 100644 +--- a/g10/keydb.h ++++ b/g10/keydb.h +@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ gpg_error_t get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key *pk, + the user ids. */ + gpg_error_t get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, + KEYDB_HANDLE *r_hd, ++ int primary_only, + const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, + int lock); + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0002-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Remove-a-signature-check-function-wrapper.patch b/backport-0002-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Remove-a-signature-check-function-wrapper.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..14a68f4a559a9479225fbc7d78ce6e73203bdb6e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Remove-a-signature-check-function-wrapper.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From b54b7f5934b23dac80220f2c34e54fd6c71e689c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Koch +Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 14:50:20 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] gpg: Remove a signature check function wrapper. + +* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Rename to +(check_signature): this and remove the old wrapper. Adjust all +callers. + +(cherry picked by dkg from commit 9cd371b12d80cfc5bc85cb6e5f5eebb4decbe94f) + +Reference link: +https://salsa.debian.org/debian/gnupg2/-/blob/debian/2.2.46-6/debian/patches/from-2.4/gpg-Remove-a-signature-check-function-wrapper.patch + +Signed-off-by: baogen shang +--- + g10/mainproc.c | 5 ++--- + g10/packet.h | 6 +----- + g10/sig-check.c | 15 +++------------ + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c +index d1c980b..8e788c3 100644 +--- a/g10/mainproc.c ++++ b/g10/mainproc.c +@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, + + /* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary + (0x00) or text document (0x01). */ +- rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md, ++ rc = check_signature (c->ctrl, sig, md, + forced_pk, + NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk); + if (! rc) +@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, + { + PKT_public_key *pk2; + +- rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2, ++ rc = check_signature (c->ctrl, sig, md2, + forced_pk, + NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, + r_pk? &pk2 : NULL); +@@ -1837,7 +1837,6 @@ issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig) + return p? bin2hex (p, n, NULL) : NULL; + } + +- + static void + print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un, + PKT_signature *sig, int rc) +diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h +index 187fffc..c40401a 100644 +--- a/g10/packet.h ++++ b/g10/packet.h +@@ -882,16 +882,12 @@ int cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b ); + + + /*-- sig-check.c --*/ +-/* Check a signature. This is shorthand for check_signature2 with +- the unnamed arguments passed as NULL. */ +-int check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest); +- + /* Check a signature. Looks up the public key from the key db. (If + * R_PK is not NULL, it is stored at RET_PK.) DIGEST contains a + * valid hash context that already includes the signed data. This + * function adds the relevant meta-data to the hash before finalizing + * it and verifying the signature. FOCRED_PK is usually NULL. */ +-gpg_error_t check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl, ++gpg_error_t check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, + PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, + PKT_public_key *forced_pk, + u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, +diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c +index afaa90a..a29470f 100644 +--- a/g10/sig-check.c ++++ b/g10/sig-check.c +@@ -63,16 +63,6 @@ sig_check_dump_stats (void) + cache_stats.goodsig, cache_stats.badsig); + } + +- +-/* Check a signature. This is shorthand for check_signature2 with +- the unnamed arguments passed as NULL. */ +-int +-check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest) +-{ +- return check_signature2 (ctrl, sig, digest, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); +-} +- +- + /* Check a signature. + * + * Looks up the public key that created the signature (SIG->KEYID) +@@ -114,7 +104,7 @@ check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest) + * + * Returns 0 on success. An error code otherwise. */ + gpg_error_t +-check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl, ++check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, + PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, + PKT_public_key *forced_pk, + u32 *r_expiredate, +@@ -721,7 +711,8 @@ check_revocation_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig) + hash_public_key(md,pk); + /* Note: check_signature only checks that the signature + is good. It does not fail if the key is revoked. */ +- rc = check_signature (ctrl, sig, md); ++ rc = check_signature (ctrl, sig, md, NULL, 0, NULL, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + cache_sig_result(sig,rc); + gcry_md_close (md); + break; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0003-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey.patch b/backport-0003-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0bea1eb7271194d455407e65bf22c42c1d8fd245 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0003-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey.patch @@ -0,0 +1,627 @@ +From 702844978d82e375f6d71b72134bc567b9c5a35f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Koch +Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 12:16:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] gpg: Fix a verification DoS due to a malicious subkey in + the keyring. + +* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey): Factor code out to ... +(get_pubkey_bykid): new. Add feature to return the keyblock. +(get_pubkey_for_sig): Add arg r_keyblock to return the used keyblock. +Request a signing usage. +(get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): Remove. +(finish_lookup): Improve debug output. +* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature): Add arg r_keyblock and pass it +down. +* g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto. +(check_sig_and_print): Use the keyblock returned by do_check_sig to +show further information instead of looking it up again with +get_pubkeyblock_for_sig. Also re-check the signature after the import +of an included keyblock. +-- + +The problem here is that it is possible to import a key from someone +who added a signature subkey from another public key and thus inhibits +that a good signature good be verified. + +Such a malicious key signature subkey must have been created w/o the +mandatory backsig which bind a signature subkey to its primary key. +For encryption subkeys this is not an issue because the existence of a +decryption private key is all you need to decrypt something and then +it does not matter if the public subkey or its binding signature has +been put below another primary key; in fact we do the latter for +ADSKs. + +GnuPG-bug-id: 7527 +Backported-from-master: 48978ccb4e20866472ef18436a32744350a65158 +(cherry picked by dkg from commit +da0164efc7f32013bc24d97b9afa9f8d67c318bb with significant edits to +align with 2.2) + +Reference link: +https://salsa.debian.org/debian/gnupg2/-/blob/debian/2.2.46-6/debian/patches/from-2.4/gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey-in-t.patch + +Signed-off-by: baogen shang +--- + g10/getkey.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + g10/keydb.h | 10 ++++- + g10/mainproc.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + g10/packet.h | 2 +- + g10/pkclist.c | 2 +- + g10/sig-check.c | 24 +++++++---- + 6 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c +index 4747176..bb23491 100644 +--- a/g10/getkey.c ++++ b/g10/getkey.c +@@ -423,27 +423,50 @@ pk_from_block (PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t found_key) + + /* Specialized version of get_pubkey which retrieves the key based on + * information in SIG. In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required. IF +- * FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK. */ ++ * FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK. ++ * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the entire keyblock is stored there if ++ * found and FORCED_PK is not used; if not used or on error NULL is ++ * stored there. */ + gpg_error_t + get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, +- PKT_public_key *forced_pk) ++ PKT_public_key *forced_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock) + { ++ gpg_error_t err; + const byte *fpr; + size_t fprlen; + ++ if (r_keyblock) ++ *r_keyblock = NULL; ++ + if (forced_pk) + { + copy_public_key (pk, forced_pk); + return 0; + } + ++ /* Make sure to request only keys cabable of signing. This makes ++ * sure that a subkey w/o a valid backsig or with bad usage flags ++ * will be skipped. */ ++ pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; ++ + /* First try the new ISSUER_FPR info. */ + fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen); +- if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, NULL, fpr, fprlen)) ++ if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, r_keyblock, fpr, fprlen)) + return 0; ++ if (r_keyblock) ++ { ++ release_kbnode (*r_keyblock); ++ *r_keyblock = NULL; ++ } + + /* Fallback to use the ISSUER_KEYID. */ +- return get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, sig->keyid); ++ err = get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl, pk, r_keyblock, sig->keyid); ++ if (err && r_keyblock) ++ { ++ release_kbnode (*r_keyblock); ++ *r_keyblock = NULL; ++ } ++ return err; + } + + +@@ -461,6 +484,10 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, + * usage will be returned. As such, it is essential that + * PK->REQ_USAGE be correctly initialized! + * ++ * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, then the first result's keyblock is ++ * returned in *R_KEYBLOCK. This should be freed using ++ * release_kbnode(). ++ * + * Returns 0 on success, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY if there is no public key + * with the specified key id, or another error code if an error + * occurs. +@@ -468,24 +495,30 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, + * If the data was not read from the cache, then the self-signed data + * has definitely been merged into the public key using + * merge_selfsigs. */ +-int +-get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key * pk, u32 * keyid) ++gpg_error_t ++get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock, ++ u32 *keyid) + { + int internal = 0; +- int rc = 0; ++ gpg_error_t rc = 0; ++ ++ if (r_keyblock) ++ *r_keyblock = NULL; + + #if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES +- if (pk) ++ if (pk && !r_keyblock) + { + /* Try to get it from the cache. We don't do this when pk is +- NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are +- cached. */ ++ * NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are cached. ++ * The old get_pubkey_function did not check PK->REQ_USAGE when ++ * reading form the caceh. This is probably a bug. Note that ++ * the cache is not used when the caller asked to return the ++ * entire keyblock. This is because the cache does not ++ * associate the public key wit its primary key. */ + pk_cache_entry_t ce; + for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next) + { + if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1]) +- /* XXX: We don't check PK->REQ_USAGE here, but if we don't +- read from the cache, we do check it! */ + { + copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk); + return 0; +@@ -538,16 +571,18 @@ get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key * pk, u32 * keyid) + ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage; + rc = lookup (ctrl, &ctx, 0, &kb, &found_key); + if (!rc) ++ pk_from_block (pk, kb, found_key); ++ getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx); ++ if (!rc && r_keyblock) + { +- pk_from_block (pk, kb, found_key); ++ *r_keyblock = kb; ++ kb = NULL; + } +- getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx); + release_kbnode (kb); + } +- if (!rc) +- goto leave; + +- rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY; ++ if (rc) /* Return a more useful error code. */ ++ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY); + + leave: + if (!rc) +@@ -558,6 +593,14 @@ leave: + } + + ++/* Wrapper for get_pubkey_bykid w/o keyblock return feature. */ ++int ++get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid) ++{ ++ return get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl, pk, NULL, keyid); ++} ++ ++ + /* Same as get_pubkey but if the key was not found the function tries + * to import it from LDAP. FIXME: We should not need this but swicth + * to a fingerprint lookup. */ +@@ -670,28 +713,6 @@ get_pubkey_fast (PKT_public_key * pk, u32 * keyid) + } + + +-/* Return the entire keyblock used to create SIG. This is a +- * specialized version of get_pubkeyblock. +- * +- * FIXME: This is a hack because get_pubkey_for_sig was already called +- * and it could have used a cache to hold the key. */ +-kbnode_t +-get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig) +-{ +- const byte *fpr; +- size_t fprlen; +- kbnode_t keyblock; +- +- /* First try the new ISSUER_FPR info. */ +- fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen); +- if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, &keyblock, fpr, fprlen)) +- return keyblock; +- +- /* Fallback to use the ISSUER_KEYID. */ +- return get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, sig->keyid); +-} +- +- + /* Return the key block for the key with key id KEYID or NULL, if an + * error occurs. Use release_kbnode() to release the key block. + * +@@ -3668,6 +3689,7 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + kbnode_t latest_key; + PKT_public_key *pk; + int req_prim; ++ int diag_exactfound = 0; + u32 curtime = make_timestamp (); + + if (r_flags) +@@ -3698,6 +3720,7 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + foundk = k; + pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key; + pk->flags.exact = 1; ++ diag_exactfound = 1; + break; + } + } +@@ -3718,10 +3741,14 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n", + (ulong) keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL), + foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage); ++ if (diag_exactfound && DBG_LOOKUP) ++ log_debug ("\texact search requested and found\n"); + + if (!req_usage) + { + latest_key = foundk ? foundk : keyblock; ++ if (DBG_LOOKUP) ++ log_debug ("\tno usage requested - accepting key\n"); + goto found; + } + +diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h +index 7457479..ee512f2 100644 +--- a/g10/keydb.h ++++ b/g10/keydb.h +@@ -318,9 +318,15 @@ void getkey_disable_caches(void); + /* Return the public key used for signature SIG and store it at PK. */ + gpg_error_t get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, + PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, +- PKT_public_key *forced_pk); ++ PKT_public_key *forced_pk, ++ kbnode_t *r_keyblock); + +-/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID and store it at PK. */ ++/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID and store it at PK. ++ * Optionally return the entire keyblock. */ ++gpg_error_t get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, ++ kbnode_t *r_keyblock, u32 *keyid); ++ ++/* Same as get_pubkey_bykid but w/o r_keyblock. */ + int get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid); + + /* Same as get_pubkey but with auto LDAP fetch. */ +diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c +index 8e788c3..f0cecec 100644 +--- a/g10/mainproc.c ++++ b/g10/mainproc.c +@@ -1077,12 +1077,15 @@ proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) + * used to verify the signature will be stored there, or NULL if not + * found. If FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used to verify + * _data signatures_ and no key lookup is done. Returns: 0 = valid +- * signature or an error code ++ * signature or an error code. If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the keyblock ++ * carries the used PK is stored there. The caller should always free ++ * the return value using release_kbnode. + */ + static int + do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, + PKT_public_key *forced_pk, int *is_selfsig, +- int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk) ++ int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, ++ PKT_public_key **r_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock) + { + PKT_signature *sig; + gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; +@@ -1092,6 +1095,8 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, + + if (r_pk) + *r_pk = NULL; ++ if (r_keyblock) ++ *r_keyblock = NULL; + + log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE); + if (is_selfsig) +@@ -1169,7 +1174,8 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, + (0x00) or text document (0x01). */ + rc = check_signature (c->ctrl, sig, md, + forced_pk, +- NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk); ++ NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk, ++ r_keyblock); + if (! rc) + md_good = md; + else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2) +@@ -1179,7 +1185,8 @@ do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, + rc = check_signature (c->ctrl, sig, md2, + forced_pk, + NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, +- r_pk? &pk2 : NULL); ++ r_pk? &pk2 : NULL, ++ r_keyblock); + if (!rc) + { + md_good = md2; +@@ -1341,7 +1348,7 @@ list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + if (opt.check_sigs) + { + fflush (stdout); +- rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + switch (gpg_err_code (rc2)) + { + case 0: sigrc = '!'; break; +@@ -1875,7 +1882,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + int is_revkey = 0; + char *issuer_fpr = NULL; + PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */ +- kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL; ++ kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; + + if (opt.skip_verify) + { +@@ -1989,7 +1996,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + { + ambiguous: + log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n")); +- return 0; ++ rc = 0; ++ goto leave; + } + } + +@@ -2024,7 +2032,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + if (sig->signers_uid) + log_info (_(" issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid); + +- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk); ++ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, &keyblock); + + /* If the key is not found but the signature includes a key block we + * use that key block for verification and on success import it. */ +@@ -2032,6 +2040,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + && sig->flags.key_block + && opt.flags.auto_key_import) + { ++ kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL; + PKT_public_key *included_pk; + const byte *kblock; + size_t kblock_len; +@@ -2043,8 +2052,13 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + kblock+1, kblock_len-1, + sig->keyid, &included_keyblock)) + { ++ /* Note: This is the only place where we use the forced_pk ++ * arg (ie. included_pk) with do_check_sig. */ + rc = do_check_sig (c, node, included_pk, +- NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk); ++ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, NULL); ++ if (opt.verbose) ++ log_info ("checked signature using included key block: %s\n", ++ gpg_strerror (rc)); + if (!rc) + { + /* The keyblock has been verified, we now import it. */ +@@ -2053,6 +2067,18 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + + } + free_public_key (included_pk); ++ release_kbnode (included_keyblock); ++ ++ /* To make sure that nothing strange happened we check the ++ * signature again now using our own key store. This also ++ * returns the keyblock which we use later on. */ ++ if (!rc) ++ { ++ release_kbnode (keyblock); ++ keyblock = NULL; ++ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, ++ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, &keyblock); ++ } + } + + /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver. Note +@@ -2099,8 +2125,13 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK); + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; + if (!res) +- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, +- NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk); ++ { ++ release_kbnode (keyblock); ++ keyblock = NULL; ++ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, ++ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, ++ &keyblock); ++ } + else if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "Pref-KS", + gpg_strerror (res)); +@@ -2141,7 +2172,12 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + /* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature, + * compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key. */ + if (!res) +- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk); ++ { ++ release_kbnode (keyblock); ++ keyblock = NULL; ++ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, ++ &keyblock); ++ } + else if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "WKD", gpg_strerror (res)); + } +@@ -2176,7 +2212,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + free_keyserver_spec (spec); + if (!res) + rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, +- NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk); ++ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, NULL); + else if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "PKA", + gpg_strerror (res)); +@@ -2209,8 +2245,13 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK); + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; + if (!res) +- rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, +- NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk); ++ { ++ release_kbnode (keyblock); ++ keyblock = NULL; ++ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, ++ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk, ++ &keyblock); ++ } + else if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "KS", gpg_strerror (res)); + } +@@ -2218,7 +2259,9 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + + if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) + { +- kbnode_t un, keyblock; ++ /* We have checked the signature and the result is either a good ++ * signature or a bad signature. Further examination follows. */ ++ kbnode_t un; + int count = 0; + int statno; + char keyid_str[50]; +@@ -2235,18 +2278,6 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + else + statno = STATUS_GOODSIG; + +- /* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the +- * keyblock has already been fetched. Thus we could use the +- * fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock. That +- * would best be done with a cache. */ +- if (included_keyblock) +- { +- keyblock = included_keyblock; +- included_keyblock = NULL; +- } +- else +- keyblock = get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (c->ctrl, sig); +- + snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ", + (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]); + +@@ -2300,7 +2331,12 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + count++; + } + +- log_assert (mainpk); ++ if (!mainpk) ++ { ++ log_error ("signature key lost from keyblock (%p,%p)\n", ++ keyblock, mainpk); ++ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); ++ } + + /* In case we did not found a valid textual userid above + we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along +@@ -2558,8 +2594,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) + log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); + } + ++ leave: + free_public_key (pk); +- release_kbnode (included_keyblock); + xfree (issuer_fpr); + return rc; + } +diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h +index c40401a..6a8ac79 100644 +--- a/g10/packet.h ++++ b/g10/packet.h +@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ gpg_error_t check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, + PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, + PKT_public_key *forced_pk, + u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, +- PKT_public_key **r_pk); ++ PKT_public_key **r_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock); + + + /*-- pubkey-enc.c --*/ +diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c +index bfc4f84..21c37fe 100644 +--- a/g10/pkclist.c ++++ b/g10/pkclist.c +@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ check_signatures_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig) + unsigned int trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN; + int rc=0; + +- rc = get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, pk, sig, NULL); ++ rc = get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, pk, sig, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { /* this should not happen */ + log_error("Ooops; the key vanished - can't check the trust\n"); +diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c +index a29470f..7194949 100644 +--- a/g10/sig-check.c ++++ b/g10/sig-check.c +@@ -102,13 +102,19 @@ sig_check_dump_stats (void) + * If R_PK is not NULL, the public key is stored at that address if it + * was found; other wise NULL is stored. + * ++ * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, the entire keyblock used to verify the ++ * signature is stored at that address. If no key was found or on ++ * some other errors NULL is stored there. The callers needs to ++ * release the keyblock using release_kbnode (kb). ++ * + * Returns 0 on success. An error code otherwise. */ + gpg_error_t + check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, + PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, + PKT_public_key *forced_pk, + u32 *r_expiredate, +- int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key **r_pk) ++ int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key **r_pk, ++ kbnode_t *r_keyblock) + { + int rc=0; + PKT_public_key *pk; +@@ -121,6 +127,8 @@ check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, + *r_revoked = 0; + if (r_pk) + *r_pk = NULL; ++ if (r_keyblock) ++ *r_keyblock = NULL; + + pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk); + if (!pk) +@@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, + log_info(_("WARNING: signature digest conflict in message\n")); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } +- else if (get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, pk, sig, forced_pk)) ++ else if (get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, pk, sig, forced_pk, r_keyblock)) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY); + else if (!gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_VERIFICATION, + pk->pubkey_algo, 0, pk->pkey, +@@ -700,9 +708,9 @@ check_revocation_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig) + keyid_from_fingerprint (ctrl, pk->revkey[i].fpr, + MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, keyid); + +- if(keyid[0]==sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1]==sig->keyid[1]) +- /* The signature was generated by a designated revoker. +- Verify the signature. */ ++ /* If the signature was generated by a designated revoker ++ * verify the signature. */ ++ if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]) + { + gcry_md_hd_t md; + +@@ -710,9 +718,9 @@ check_revocation_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig) + BUG (); + hash_public_key(md,pk); + /* Note: check_signature only checks that the signature +- is good. It does not fail if the key is revoked. */ ++ * is good. It does not fail if the key is revoked. */ + rc = check_signature (ctrl, sig, md, NULL, 0, NULL, +- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ NULL, NULL, NULL); + cache_sig_result(sig,rc); + gcry_md_close (md); + break; +@@ -918,7 +926,7 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer, + if (IS_CERT (sig)) + signer->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; + +- rc = get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, signer, sig, NULL); ++ rc = get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl, signer, sig, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { + if (signer_alloced != 1) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0004-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch b/backport-0004-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7e2254b5a10539b7d3df434b6c666796898361bc --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0004-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +From 3339c147b6f5b684900e2721929d52021682a761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Koch +Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 17:17:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] gpg: Fix regression for the recent malicious subkey DoS + fix. + +* g10/packet.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY): New. +* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): Pass new flag also to requested +usage. +(finish_lookup): Introduce a verify_mode. +-- + +Fixes-commit: da0164efc7f32013bc24d97b9afa9f8d67c318bb +GnuPG-bug-id: 7547 + +Reference link: +https://salsa.debian.org/debian/gnupg2/-/blob/debian/2.2.46-6/debian/patches/from-2.4/gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-DoS-fi.patch + +Signed-off-by: baogen shang +--- + g10/getkey.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + g10/packet.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c +index bb23491..ce5c46f 100644 +--- a/g10/getkey.c ++++ b/g10/getkey.c +@@ -422,11 +422,12 @@ pk_from_block (PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t found_key) + + + /* Specialized version of get_pubkey which retrieves the key based on +- * information in SIG. In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required. IF ++ * information in SIG. In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required. If + * FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK. + * If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the entire keyblock is stored there if + * found and FORCED_PK is not used; if not used or on error NULL is +- * stored there. */ ++ * stored there. Use this function only to find the key for ++ * verification; it can't be used to select a key for signing. */ + gpg_error_t + get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, + PKT_public_key *forced_pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock) +@@ -446,8 +447,9 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, + + /* Make sure to request only keys cabable of signing. This makes + * sure that a subkey w/o a valid backsig or with bad usage flags +- * will be skipped. */ +- pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; ++ * will be skipped. We also request the verification mode so that ++ * expired and reoked keys are returned. */ ++ pk->req_usage = (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY); + + /* First try the new ISSUER_FPR info. */ + fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen); +@@ -511,10 +513,10 @@ get_pubkey_bykid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t *r_keyblock, + /* Try to get it from the cache. We don't do this when pk is + * NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are cached. + * The old get_pubkey_function did not check PK->REQ_USAGE when +- * reading form the caceh. This is probably a bug. Note that ++ * reading from the cache. This is probably a bug. Note that + * the cache is not used when the caller asked to return the + * entire keyblock. This is because the cache does not +- * associate the public key wit its primary key. */ ++ * associate the public key with its primary key. */ + pk_cache_entry_t ce; + for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next) + { +@@ -3690,11 +3692,18 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + PKT_public_key *pk; + int req_prim; + int diag_exactfound = 0; ++ int verify_mode = 0; + u32 curtime = make_timestamp (); + + if (r_flags) + *r_flags = 0; + ++ ++ /* The verify mode is used to change the behaviour so that we can ++ * return an expired or revoked key for signature verification. */ ++ verify_mode = ((req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY) ++ && (req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)); ++ + #define USAGE_MASK (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) + req_usage &= USAGE_MASK; + +@@ -3738,9 +3747,9 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + } + + if (DBG_LOOKUP) +- log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n", ++ log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x%s)\n", + (ulong) keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL), +- foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage); ++ foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage, verify_mode? ",verify":""); + if (diag_exactfound && DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\texact search requested and found\n"); + +@@ -3802,28 +3811,28 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + } + + n_subkeys++; +- if (pk->flags.revoked) ++ if (!verify_mode && pk->flags.revoked) + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\tsubkey has been revoked\n"); + n_revoked_or_expired++; + continue; + } +- if (pk->has_expired) ++ if (!verify_mode && pk->has_expired) + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\tsubkey has expired\n"); + n_revoked_or_expired++; + continue; + } +- if (pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from) ++ if (!verify_mode && pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from) + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\tsubkey not yet valid\n"); + continue; + } + +- if (want_secret && agent_probe_secret_key (NULL, pk)) ++ if (!verify_mode && want_secret && agent_probe_secret_key (NULL, pk)) + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\tno secret key\n"); +@@ -3831,7 +3840,8 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + } + + if (DBG_LOOKUP) +- log_debug ("\tsubkey might be fine\n"); ++ log_debug ("\tsubkey might be fine%s\n", ++ verify_mode? " for verification":""); + /* In case a key has a timestamp of 0 set, we make sure + that it is used. A better change would be to compare + ">=" but that might also change the selected keys and +@@ -3872,12 +3882,12 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + log_debug ("\tprimary key usage does not match: " + "want=%x have=%x\n", req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage); + } +- else if (pk->flags.revoked) ++ else if (!verify_mode && pk->flags.revoked) + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\tprimary key has been revoked\n"); + } +- else if (pk->has_expired) ++ else if (!verify_mode && pk->has_expired) + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) + log_debug ("\tprimary key has expired\n"); +@@ -3885,7 +3895,8 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + else /* Okay. */ + { + if (DBG_LOOKUP) +- log_debug ("\tprimary key may be used\n"); ++ log_debug ("\tprimary key may be used%s\n", ++ verify_mode? " for verification":""); + latest_key = keyblock; + } + } +diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h +index 6a8ac79..ca7aad9 100644 +--- a/g10/packet.h ++++ b/g10/packet.h +@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ typedef struct { + gcry_mpi_t data[PUBKEY_MAX_NENC]; + } PKT_pubkey_enc; + ++#define PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY 16384 /* Verify only modifier. */ + + /* A one-pass signature packet as defined in RFC 4880, Section + 5.4. All fields are serialized. */ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0005-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch b/backport-0005-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..347f736059eeb9fecfe4d3a57ab07f47632a9f94 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0005-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 660926a5cd6daedab2f7b9df935bb3f7f5776169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Koch +Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 15:11:55 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] gpg: Allow the use of an ADSK subkey as ADSK subkey. + +* g10/packet.h (PKT_public_key): Increased size of req_usage to 16. +* g10/getkey.c (key_byname): Set allow_adsk in the context if ir was +requested via req_usage. +(finish_lookup): Allow RENC usage matching. +* g10/keyedit.c (append_adsk_to_key): Adjust the assert. +* g10/keygen.c (prepare_adsk): Also allow to find an RENC subkey. +-- + +If an ADSK is to be added it may happen that an ADSK subkey is found +first and this should then be used even that it does not have the E +usage. However, it used to have that E usage when it was added. + +While testing this I found another pecularity: If you do + gpg -k ADSK_SUBKEY_FPR +without the '!' suffix and no corresponding encryption subkey is dound, +you will get an unusabe key error. I hesitate to fix that due to +possible side-effects. + +GnuPG-bug-id: 6882 +Backported-from-master: d30e345692440b9c6677118c1d20b9d17d80f873 + +Reference link: +https://dev.gnupg.org/rG794950ec755eab3729d5a5905cbbc2e2d98b8699 +(sbg: for fixing the poc failed, we only backport the type of req_usage change line) + +Note that we still use the NO_AKL and not the newer TRY_LDAP in 2.2. +We may want to backport that change as well. + +Signed-off-by: baogen shang +--- + g10/packet.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h +index ca7aad9..9e7685c 100644 +--- a/g10/packet.h ++++ b/g10/packet.h +@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ typedef struct + /* The public key algorithm. (Serialized.) */ + byte pubkey_algo; + byte pubkey_usage; /* for now only used to pass it to getkey() */ +- byte req_usage; /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */ ++ u16 req_usage; /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */ + u32 has_expired; /* set to the expiration date if expired */ + /* keyid of the primary key. Never access this value directly. + Instead, use pk_main_keyid(). */ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0006-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch b/backport-0006-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5067768803cc5a1060dbca2c8dce07857c1cde7 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0006-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 9b7c067717d815e16f9ea3cec88bca09a6cce7cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Koch +Date: Fri, 2 May 2025 11:11:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] gpg: Fix another regression due to the T7547 fix. + +* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): Keep a requested +PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT. +(finish_lookup): For correctness in future use cases allow +PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT to also trigger verify mode. +-- + +The case here was that a cert-only primary key was removed with +export-clean. + +GnuPG-bug-id: 7583 +--- + g10/getkey.c | 8 +++++--- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c +index e3264062f..ae0e00220 100644 +--- a/g10/getkey.c ++++ b/g10/getkey.c +@@ -341,8 +341,10 @@ get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, + /* Make sure to request only keys cabable of signing. This makes + * sure that a subkey w/o a valid backsig or with bad usage flags + * will be skipped. We also request the verification mode so that +- * expired and reoked keys are returned. */ +- pk->req_usage = (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY); ++ * expired and revoked keys are returned. We keep only a requested ++ * CERT usage in PK for the sake of key signatures. */ ++ pk->req_usage = (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY ++ | (pk->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)); + + /* First try the new ISSUER_FPR info. */ + fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen); +@@ -3736,7 +3738,7 @@ finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact, + /* The verify mode is used to change the behaviour so that we can + * return an expired or revoked key for signature verification. */ + verify_mode = ((req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY) +- && (req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)); ++ && (req_usage & (PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT|PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))); + + #define USAGE_MASK (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) + req_usage &= USAGE_MASK; +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/gnupg2.spec b/gnupg2.spec index 108dd6b5ac5c99a36171257bc8346acff7748224..08c2fb942b02be77b36abdbf59a660fd021f0be6 100644 --- a/gnupg2.spec +++ b/gnupg2.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: gnupg2 Version: 2.2.32 -Release: 6 +Release: 7 Summary: Utility for secure communication and data storage License: GPLv3+ @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ Patch11: common-Avoid-undefined-behavior-of-left-shift-operat.patch Patch12: backport-CVE-2022-34903.patch Patch13: backport-common-Protect-against-a-theoretical-integer-overflow.patch Patch14: backport-gpg-Fix-double-free-of-internal-data.patch +Patch15: backport-0001-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Lookup-key-for-merging-inserting-only-by-primary.patch +Patch16: backport-0002-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Remove-a-signature-check-function-wrapper.patch +Patch17: backport-0003-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-a-verification-DoS-due-to-a-malicious-subkey.patch +Patch18: backport-0004-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-regression-for-the-recent-malicious-subkey-D.patch +Patch19: backport-0005-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Allow-the-use-of-an-ADSK-subkey-as-ADSK-subkey.patch +Patch20: backport-0006-CVE-2025-30258-gpg-Fix-another-regression-due-to-the-T7547-fix.patch BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: zlib-devel, npth-devel, texinfo @@ -120,6 +126,9 @@ make check %changelog +* Tue May 6 2025 yixiangzhike - 2.2.32-7 +- fix CVE-2025-30258 + * Fri Mar 21 2025 yixiangzhike - 2.2.32-6 - backport upstream patch to fix double free